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UNAUTHORIZED AND FORGED
INDORSEMENTS: A GLITCH IN REVISED




The drafters of both the 1990 pre-revision [hereinafter
"pre-revision" or "pre-revised"] and the 1990 revision [herein-
after "revision" or "revised"] of Article 3 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code [hereinafter "the Code"] recognized the harsh
reality that, in forged' check situations, recovery from the
forger is rarely a viable solution. Both versions, therefore, in-
clude a number of rules governing loss allocation in cases in-
volving unauthorized or forged signatures. 2 Working to-
gether, these rules are designed to create a scheme which
places the losses occasioned by unauthorized and forged sig-
natures on the party in the best position to have avoided their
making. In most cases, this objective is accomplished by allo-
cating the loss to the person who obtained the instrument
from the wrongdoer. However, where a party to the instru-
ment has acted in a negligent manner, and this negligence
substantially contributed to the forgery of a signature on the
* Associate Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. The author
wishes to acknowledge and express her gratitude to Professor Jeffrey Morris,
University of Dayton School of Law and Associate Professor Peter Alexander,
The Dickinson School of Law, for their comments and unrelenting support.
1. Although an unauthorized signature may be technically distinguishable
from a forged signature, as used in this article, the terms are viewed as inter-
changeable. For an enlightened, albeit brief, discussion of unauthorized signa-
tures which are not forgeries, see Arthur G. Murphey, Jr., Revised Article 3 and
Amended Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Comments on the Changes
They Will Make, 46 ARK. L. REV. 501, 567-68 (1993).
2. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-405 (Pre-revision 1990) (impostors and fictitious
payees), 3-406 (negligence contributing to unauthorized signature), 3-417 (pre-
sentment and transfer warranties) and 3-419 (conversion of instrument), and
revision §§ 3-404 (impostors and fictitious payees), 3-405 (employer's responsi-
bility for fraudulent indorsement by employee), 3-406 (negligence contributing
to forged signature), 3-416 (transfer warranties), 3-417 (presentment warran-
ties) and 3-420 (conversion of instrument).
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instrument, the negligent party is often in a superior position
to have prevented the fraud.
In both versions, the drafters included special rules,
found in section 3-406, which may be used in negligence cases
to shift the loss to the negligent person either entirely3 or to
the extent the negligence contributed to the loss. 4 In the
past, application of the loss allocation rules, in a manner
which would produce results consistent with the underlying
policy, frequently proved problematic to courts. The pre-revi-
sion contained several gaps and inconsistencies which often
frustrated the ability of courts to shift the loss to the negli-
gent party and, consequently, thwarted the goal of placing
the ultimate loss on the person who could have best pre-
vented it.
Application of section 3-406 in a manner which consist-
ently allocates the loss to the person who could best have pre-
vented it is particularly vexing in situations involving forged
or unauthorized payee indorsements. In the case of checks,
whether a loss may ultimately be shifted to the negligent per-
son often rests on whether the person seeking to shift the loss
still possesses the instrument. In most cases, this depends on
whether the drawee5 honors or dishonors a check when it is
presented for payment.6 In instances in which the check is
honored the drawee can usually recover the amount paid by
shifting the loss to the person who took the check from the
wrongdoer in a warranty action.7 However, whether the loss
3. Section 3-406 of the pre-revision employs a strict contributory negli-
gence standard to allocate the entire loss to the negligent party where loss shift-
ing is applicable. See U.C.C. § 3-406 (Pre-revision 1990).
4. Revised § 3-406 utilizes a comparative negligence standard where the
negligence of a party has contributed to a loss occasioned by a forged signature.
See U.C.C. § 3-406 (1990 Revision).
5. A "drawee" is defined as "a person ordered in a draft [including a check]
to make payment." U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(2) (1990 Revision). The drawee on a
check is the bank whose name is printed on the check as the bank where the
person writing the check maintains a checking account.
6. A check that is honored by the drawee upon presentment for payment is
retained by the drawee. The check is thereafter forwarded to the drawer, or
information pertaining to payment of the check made available to the drawer,
in the drawer's statement of account. See U.C.C. § 4-406 (1990 Revision). A
check that is dishonored when presented for payment is returned to the pre-
senter. See U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(b) (Pre-revision 1990) and U.C.C. § 3-420 (1990
Revision).
7. The ability to shift the loss to the person who took the check from the
wrongdoer is achieved through the use of the warranty provisions found in sec-
tion 3-416 and section 3-417 of the pre-revision.
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can further be shifted to the negligent person remains
problematic.
In construing the provisions of section 3-406 under the
pre-revision, judges generally interpreted Article 3 as disal-
lowing recovery from a person whose negligence substantially
contributed to the making of a forged or unauthorized signa-
ture by way of an affirmative action brought directly against
the negligent person.' In many such cases the only recourse
for the transferee who obtained the instrument from a wrong-
doer was to attempt to recover from the wrongdoer-who had
usually absconded with the proceeds-or to attempt to re-
cover from the negligent person who contributed to the mak-
ing of the unauthorized signature by way of a negligence ac-
tion grounded in tort.9 Thus far, however, a federal court
applying New Jersey law is apparently the only jurisdiction
to permit a cause of action in tort in these circumstances.1"
Many of the areas which created difficulties under the
pre-revision1 are solved in the 1990 revision. 12 However,
where a payee's1 3 negligence substantially aids a thief in
forging the payee's indorsement, the revision leaves available
to a negligent payee a major loophole. This loophole will con-
tinue to propagate results contrary to the general policy in
unauthorized or forged signature situations of shifting the
loss to the negligent person whose actions substantially con-
tributed to enabling the wrongdoer to successfully perpetrate
the fraud.
8. See Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.J.
1979); Steven W. Mershon, Allocating Losses from Forged Indorsements Be-
tween Negligent Drawers and Depository Banks: Girard v. Mt. Holly State
Bank, 41 Omo ST. L.J. 801 (1980); Douglas J. Whaley, Negligence and Negotia-
ble Instruments, 53 N.C. L. REV. 1, 19 (1974). But see, Park State Bank v.
Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 207 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
9. See, e.g., Girard Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225.
10. Id. at 1240.
11. One major problem involves the requirement that one must either be a
holder in due course, a drawee, or other payor to invoke the negligence preclu-
sion of section 3-406. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. Another
chief problem is the inability of a warrantor to invoke section 3-406 as a defense
in a warranty action by a drawee. See infra notes 138-142 and accompanying
text.
12. See infra notes 142, 151-52 and accompanying text.
13. Although not expressly defined in the Code, a "payee" referes to the per-
son who is named on a check as the person to whose order the drawee is di-
rected to make payment. For example, Susan Smith is the payee in "Pay to the
order of Susan Smith $_ ."
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This article will focus on negligence which substantially
contributed to forged or unauthorized payee indorsements
and will address three primary areas: 1) loss allocation
under the pre-1990 revision; 2) changes in the 1990 revision,
which solved some of the problems inherent in the pre-revi-
sion; and 3) the problem carried forward under the revision,
which continues to allow a negligent payee to circumvent the
general loss allocation rules. While many of the rules dis-
cussed in this article are applicable to negotiable instruments
other than checks, 14 this article will limit its discussion to
transactions involving checks. 15
II. BACKGROUND
When a check is presented to a drawee for payment, un-
less it has previously been accepted, 16 the drawee has two op-
tions: it may honor the check by paying the presenter the
face amount of the check, or it may dishonor the check by
refusing to pay the face amount to the presenter.17 A dishon-
ored check is normally returned to the presenter who may
then seek payment from the drawer' 8 under the drawer's con-
tract obligation,' 9 or from a previous indorser under the in-
14. Other negotiable instruments which are not checks include drafts
which are not drawn on a bank and promissory notes.
15. As stated in revised section 3-104(f): "'Check' means (i) a draft other
than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a
cashier's check or teller's check. An instrument may be a check even though it
is described on its face by another term, such as 'money order.'"
U.C.C. § 3-104(f) (1990 Revision).
16. "Acceptance" is defined as the drawee's signed engagement or agree-
ment to honor the check upon presentment for payment. See U.C.C. § 3-410(1)
(Pre-revision 1990); U.C.C. § 3-409(a) (1990 Revision).
17. Under section 3-408 of the revision and section 3-409(1) of the pre-revi-
sion, an unaccepted check does not operate as an assignment of funds in the
drawer's account. Further, under section 3-402(a) of both versions, a party is
not obligated on an instrument which that party or the party's representative
has not signed.
18. A "drawer" is defined as "a person who signs or is identified in a draft
[including a check] as a person ordering payment." U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(3) (Pre-
revision 1990). For example, if James Jones writes Susan Smith a check for
$100, James Jones is the drawer.
19. Under section 3-414 of the revision, upon presentment, dishonor and
notice, a drawer of an unaltered, unaccepted check is obligated to pay the
holder, or other person entitled to enforce the check the amount of the check.
Section 3-413 of the pre-revision mandates a similar duty extending to the
holder or indorsers, unless the drawer disclaimed this obligation. See U.C.C.
§ 3-413 (1990 Revision).
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dorser's contract obligation.2 ° If the drawee honors the
check, the drawee then debits the amount of the check from
the drawer's account.21 Thus, regardless of whether the
check is honored or dishonored by the drawee, if the check
has been properly issued22 and indorsed, normally the pre-
senter is able to obtain payment of the check. If, on the other
hand, the payee's indorsement has been forged, the ability of
the presenter to ultimately obtain 23 or retain24 payment on
the check becomes significantly more complicated and in
some cases impossible.
Where the payee's negligence has made the forgery of his
or her indorsement to the check possible, the payee is often in
a superior position to have prevented the fraud than the per-
son who acquired the check from the forger. In recognition of
the crucial function negligence plays in who should ulti-
mately bear the loss in forgery cases, both versions of Article
3 include provisions in section 3-406 which deal with negli-
gent acts that contribute to the making of a forged signature.
In the absence of the ability to recover from the forger, these
provisions are intended to shift the ultimate loss to the party
whose negligence played a major role in making the forgery
possible.
A major problem area under the pre-revision of Article 3
involved the interpretation and application of the language of
section 3-406 which provides:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contrib-
utes to . .. the making of an unauthorized signature is
precluded from asserting the ... lack of authority against
a holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor
20. The contract obligation of an indorser is similar to that of the drawer. If
a prior indorser is called upon to pay the amount of the check the indorser may
recover from the drawer under the drawer's contract liability. See U.C.C. § 3-
414 (Pre-revision 1990) and U.C.C. § 3-415 (1990 Revision).
21. See U.C.C. § 4-401 (1990 Revision) (both versions permit the bank to
debit its customer's account for items which are properly payable from the ac-
count). See infra text accompanying notes 155-59.
22. Revised section 3-105(a) defines "issue" as "the first delivery of an in-
strument by the maker or drawer, whether to a holder or a non-holder, for the
purpose of giving rights on the instrument to any person." U.C.C. § 3-105(a)
(1990 Revision).
23. The ability to initially obtain payment is the problem where the check is
dishonored.
24. The ability to retain the benefit of payment by avoiding payment to the
drawee under a warranty claim is the problem where the check has been
honored.
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who pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance
with reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or
payor's business.
Most of the cases construing this section under the pre-
revision involved a drawer whose negligence resulted in the
forgery of the payee's signature. Courts have split on
whether to allow section 3-406 to shift the loss to the negli-
gent person by way of an affirmative action, as apposed to
allowing the preclusion to serve solely as a defense against
the negligent person who sought to replevy the check or to
recover the proceeds in a conversion action. A major factor
engendering misapplication in some cases stemmed from an
apparent inability of jurists to differentiate between liability
grounded in contract and liability founded on breach of war-
ranty principles.25 Moreover, even when the provisions of
section 3-406 were correctly applied, a court's rationale re-
garding the applicability of the section's preclusion in a par-
ticular case was not always clearly articulated.26
25. See, e.g., Koerner & Lambert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 179 (La. Ct.
App. 1979). In this case, Burnell Robinson and George Driscoll were both in-
sured by Allstate. Without notifying either of them, Allstate delivered checks to
Paul Boucher, the owner of Marina-Rama, for repairs to Robinson's and Dris-
coil's boats. The check covering Robinson's repairs named Robinson as the sole
payee. The check covering Driscoll's repairs was jointly payable to Driscoll and
Marina-Rama. Although the boats were never repaired, Boucher forged Robin-
son's name and directed the forgery of Driscoll's name to the checks then trans-
ferred them to the law firm of Koerner & Lambert, to be applied to debts owed
to Boucher's creditors who were contemplating bankruptcy proceedings against
Boucher. The checks were deposited into Koerner & Lambert's account with its
bank and were paid by the drawee. Only after payment by the drawee were the
proceeds of the checks distributed to Boucher's creditors.
Several months after the checks' proceeds were disbursed to Boucher's
creditors the forgeries were discovered. Utilizing the Code's warranty rules, the
drawee successfully shifted the loss occasioned by payment of the checks to
Koerner & Lambert's depository bank, which in turn debited Koerner & Lam-
bert's account in the amount of the checks. Koerner & Lambert then sued All-
state to recover it loss.
In rendering judgment for Koerner & Lambert, the court held that, because
of its substantial negligence in delivering the checks to Boucher without notify-
ing Robinson and Driscoll, Allstate was precluded under section 3-406 from as-
serting the forgeries against Koerner & Lambert who was a holder in due
course. In holding that Koerner & Lambert was a holder in due course, the
court never addressed the requirement that one must first qualify as a holder in
order to be a holder in due course.
26. See, e.g., Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 207 N.E.2d 158
(Ill. App. Ct. 1965). For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying
notes 124, 127-29.
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III. NEGLIGENCE: CONTRACT V. WARRANTY LI.ABILITY
Where the instrument has been dishonored, courts liber-
ally interpret section 3-406 as imposing liability on a negli-
gent person whose signature was forged as the purported
drawer 27 and on an actual drawer whose negligence substan-
tially contributed to the forging of the indorsement of the
named payee.28 However, where an instrument bearing a
forged payee's indorsement is honored by the drawee, few
courts have permitted recovery against the drawer even
though the drawer's negligence substantially contributed to
the forged indorsement. 29 The rationale for the different out-
comes emanates from the variance between the rules gov-
erning warranty liability and those governing contract
liability.
To appreciate the intricacies of many of the problems and
much of the confusion in applying the Code's loss allocation
rules, an explanation of the different functions a signature on
an instrument may serve is required. This explanation will
also be useful as a context for examining many of the related
provisions in the contract and warranty areas.
A. Purposes Served by Signatures to a Check
1. Functions of a Drawer's Signature
The drawer's signature on an instrument serves two pri-
mary functions. First, it serves as an order 30 to the drawee to
pay a fixed amount of money3 ' to the person designated by
27. See, e.g., Dubin v. Hudson County Probation Dep't, 630 A.2d 1207 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1993) (construing "other payor" language in section 3-406 to include
a check cashing enterprise).
28. See Park State Bank, 207 N.E.2d 158.
29. See, e.g., Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225
(D.N.J. 1979). For details, see infra text accompanying notes 125-26, 130-33.
See also Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Merchants Bank, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
691 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Koerner & Lambert, 374 So. 2d 179.
30. "Order" is defined as "a direction to pay and must be more than an au-
thorization or request." U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(b) (1990 Pre-revision). See also,
U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(6) (1990 Revision).
31. In addition to other requirements, to qualify as a negotiable instru-
ment, a writing must contain an unconditional order from the drawer to the
drawee (or, in the case of a promissory note, an unconditional promise by the
maker) to pay a fixed sum of money. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1990 Revision) and
U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b) (Pre-revision 1990).
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the payee named on the instrument.3 2 Where the drawer or-
ders the drawee to pay a check to the order of a named payee,
the drawee may legitimately debit the drawer's account only
for payment which is made to the named payee or to a person
designated by the named payee to receive payment.3 3 Sec-
ond, the drawer's signature serves to impose liability upon
the drawer to pay the check3 4 if the drawee refuses to honor
the drawer's order to pay the amount specified on the check. 5
2. Functions of an Indorser's Signature
The term "indorsement" is not explicitly defined in the
pre- revised Code. 36 Pre-revised section 3-202(2) speaks of in-
dorsements but merely provides that an indorsement must be
made "by or on behalf of the holder. '3 7 However, it is clear
from other provisions of pre-revised Article 3 that an indorse-
ment may serve three distinct purposes under negotiable in-
struments law: 1) to cause a transfer of the instrument to re-
sult in its negotiation;38 2) to restrict payment of the
instrument;39 and 3) to make the indorser liable on the in-
32. To qualify as a negotiable instrument under the pre-revision, an instru-
ment must indicate that it is payable to a named payee's order, or to the bearer
of the instrument. See U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(d) (Pre-revision 1990). The revision
retains this requirement for all instruments other than checks to qualify as
negotiable instruments. See U.C.C. § 3-104(c) (1990 Revision).
33. See U.C.C. § 4-401 (1990 Revision) and infra text accompanying notes
155-57 (discussing when an instrument is properly payable).
34. Pre-revised section 3-413(2) permitted a drawer to avoid contractual lia-
bility on any instrument by indicating the instrument was drawn without re-
course. Under the revision, a drawer may no longer avoid contract obligations
where checks are concerned. Specifically, revised section 3-414(e) states in per-
tinent part:
If a draft states that it is drawn "without recourse" or otherwise dis-
claims liability of the drawer to pay the draft, the drawer is not liable
... to pay the draft if the draft is not a check. A disclaimer of liability
stated in subsection (b) is not effective if the draft is a check.
U.C.C. § 3-414(e) (1990 Revision) (emphasis added).
35. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
36. One of the major complaints concerning the text of Article 3, is that to
understand what it says, "you must first know the law of negotiable instru-
ments. In other words, the Code is not a code that tells a student or banker or a
lawyer what the law is. It is rather a compilation of notes that may serve to
remind you of the law you had better know before you read the UCC." David
Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185,
192-93 (1967). For a discussion of the difficulty in grasping the meaning of the
term "indorsement," see id. at 193.
37. U.C.C. § 3-202(2) (Pre-revision 1990).
38. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
39. Pre-revised section 3-205 provides:
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strument if it is dishonored by the drawee.40 Section 3-204 of
the revision expressly defines the term indorsement as "a sig-
nature, other than that of a signer as maker, drawer or ac-
ceptor," made for the purpose of "(1) negotiating the instru-
ment, (2) restricting payment of the instrument, or (3)
incurring indorser's liability on the instrument."41 While, in
most instances an indorsement will serve more than one of
these functions,42 it is important to distinguish between the
functions being served in a particular situation and to appre-
hend the import of these distinctions.
The indorsement of the named payee on a check is a sine
qua non to the negotiation of a check. A negotiation is de-
fined under section 3-202(1) of the pre-revision as "the trans-
fer of an instrument in such form that the transferee becomes
a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated
by delivery with the necessary indorsement; if payable to
bearer it is negotiated by delivery [alone]."43 Similarly,
under the revision, the transfer of an instrument which
names a payee results in a negotiation only if indorsed by the
payee and transferred in a manner whereby the transferee
becomes a holder.44 Under both versions of the Code, there-
An indorsement is restrictive which either
(a) is conditional; or
(b) purports to prohibit further transfer of the instrument; or
(c) includes the words "for collection", "for deposit", "pay any bank", or
like terms signifying a purpose of deposit or collection; or
(d) otherwise states that it is for the benefit or use of the indorser or of
another person.
U.C.C. § 3-205 (Pre-revision 1990).
40. See U.C.C. § 3-414 (Pre-revision 1990).
41. U.C.C. § 3-204 (1990 Revision).
42. For example, an unrestricted indorsement by Janet Jones on a check on
which she is the named payee is required under pre-revised section 3-205 before
any subsequent transferee can become a holder. Her indorsement also makes
her liable as an indorser to pay the instrument under section 3-414 upon timely
notice of its dishonor.
43. U.C.C. § 3-202 (Pre-revision 1990).
44. Revised section 3-201 provides that:
(a) "Negotiation" means a transfer of possession, whether voluntary or
involuntary, of an instrument by a person other than the issuer to a
person who thereby becomes its holder.
(b) Except for negotiation by a remitter, if an instrument is payable to
an identified person, negotiation requires transfer of possession of
the instrument and its indorsement by the holder. If the instru-
ment is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of pos-
session alone.
U.C.C. § 3-201 (1990 Revision).
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fore, a check must be negotiated in order for a transferee of
the check to qualify as its holder. Additionally, while a check
which names a specified payee may be transferred without
the transferee becoming its holder, the transferee is not enti-
tled to obtain payment on the check unless she qualifies as a
holder or has acquired the rights of a holder as a result of the
transfer.4 5
The second function an indorsement may serve is to
place restrictions on actual payment of the instrument. Such
restrictions may operate to place limitations on who may sub-
sequently obtain payment on the instrument,46 or to restrict
the manner in which the proceeds of payment of the instru-
ment are to be applied.4 v An indorser may place a "special" or
"blank" indorsement on a check.48 A blank indorsement is ac-
complished by simply signing one's name to a check other
than as its drawer or drawee. A blank indorsement causes
the check to become a bearer instrument which may be re-
peatedly negotiated without additional indorsements by sub-
sequent transferors. 49 For example, without indorsing it,
Sam Smith may negotiate a check to Bob Brown on which
Janet Jones is the payee named on the face of the check if
Janet Jones has indorsed the check in blank. However, Janet
may restrict Sam's ability to negotiate the check without his
indorsement by designating Sam Smith as the new payee
when she indorses the check. An indorsement, such as this,
which specifies a particular payee is referred to as a special
indorsement.5 0 Thus, an indorsement which reads "Pay Sam
Smith /s/ Janet Jones," cannot be negotiated by Sam without
his blank or special indorsement. Additionally, while an in-
45. Article 3 recognizes that an instrument may be legitimately transferred
without the transferee becoming a holder. See U.C.C. § 3-201(1) (Pre-revision
1990). See also U.C.C. § 3-203 (1990 Revision). In certain instances revised
section 3-203(b) and pre-revised section 3-201(1) permit a transferee who is not
a holder to enforce the instrument by stepping into the shoes of a prior holder.
Neither version permits the enforcement of a check which was never'negotiated
by the named payee. See U.C.C. § 3-301 (Pre-revision 1990 and 1990 Revision).
46. See U.C.C. § 3-205 (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-204 (Pre-revision 1990)
and infra text accompanying note 50.
47. See U.C.C. § 3-206 (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-205 (Pre-revision 1990)
and infra text accompanying note 52.
48. U.C.C. § 3-205 (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-204 (Pre-revision 1990).
49. See U.C.C. § 3-205(b) (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-204(2) (Pre-revision
1990).




dorsement may not be used to entirely prohibit the instru-
ment's further transfer or negotiation, 51 a special or blank in-
dorsement may include accompanying language which places
some restrictions on how the proceeds of the instrument shall
be used, as for instance, "for deposit only," followed by an
indorsement.52
The third purpose an indorsement may serve is to impose
contract obligations upon an indorser.53 Unless expressly
disclaimed, 54 any indorsement on an instrument, whether re-
quired for negotiation or not, imposes upon the signer the
contract obligations of an indorser. Therefore, if Sam Smith
places his unqualified indorsement5 5 on'a check made paya-
ble to Janet Jones which Janet has indorsed in blank, Sam
Smith assumes the same contract obligations as Janet. As
these examples illustrate, an indorsement may simultane-
ously serve all three functions. For example, by placing an
unqualified special indorsement on a check made payable to
her, and transferring it to Sam Smith, Janet Jones negotiates
the check, places restrictions on its payment and incurs con-
tract obligations as an indorser.
An understanding of the different functions a signature
may serve on an instrument, and the function being served in
any given situation is crucial to understanding how losses are
allocated under contract versus warranty principles. The sig-
nificance of the different purposes becomes even more impor-
tant when the instrument contains a forged signature, partic-
51. For example, an indorsement which also states that it is payable "only"
to Sam Smith, will not preclude Sam from indorsing the instrument and further
negotiating it. See U.C.C. § 3-206(a) (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-206(1) (Pre-
revision 1990).
52. See U.C.C. § 3-206(c) (1990 Revision); U.C.C. §§ 3-205, 3-206 (Pre-revi-
sion 1990).
53. See U.C.C. § 3-415 (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-414 (Pre-revision 1990).
See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
54. Both versions of Article 3 permit an indorser to avoid the imposition of
the contract obligation of an indorser to pay the check in the event it is dishon-
ored by stating on the check that the indorsement is made "without recourse,"
or through the use of similar language disclaiming any obligation to pay the
check if it is later dishonored. See U.C.C. § 3-415(b) (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-
414(1) (Pre-revision 1990).
55. The term "unqualified" is used here to refer to an indorsement which is
not supplemented by language which purports to disclaim an indorser's con-
tract liability. See U.C.C. § 3-414(1) (Pre-revision 1990); U.C.C. § 3-414(e)
(1990 Revision).
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ularly when the negligence of a purported party to the
instrument substantially contributed to the forgery.
B. Contract Liability
1. General Requirements for Contract Liability
The contract obligations of a drawer are contained in
subsection (b) of revised section 3-414 which provides that,
where an unaccepted check is dishonored "the drawer is
obliged to pay [it] according to its terms at the time it was
issued or.. . first came into possession of a holder.. . , to any
person entitled to enforce it, or to an indorser who paid [it]."
56
Subsection (a) of revised section 3-415 sets out the contract
obligations of an indorser and provides in pertinent part that,
"if an instrument is dishonored, an indorser is obliged to pay
the amount due on the instrument ... according to the terms
of the instrument at the time it was indorsed."57 However,
under both versions of the Code, whether a person assumes
contract liability on an instrument as a drawer or an indorser
is predicated on whether that person's binding signature ap-
pears on the instrument.
58
Subsection (a) of revised section 3-401 provides that: "A
person is not liable on an instrument unless (i) the person
signed the instrument, or (ii) the person is represented by an
agent or representative who signed the instrument and the
signature is binding on the represented person .... , Sub-
section (1) of pre-revised section 3-401, similarly provided
that "[n]o person is liable on an instrument unless his signa-
ture appears thereon."6 ° It is important to note that neither
version of section 3-401 operates to impose liability, but oper-
56. Section 3-413(2) of the pre-revision similarly provides that, subject to
presentment, dishonor and any necessary notice of dishonor, the basic contract
of a drawer is to pay the instrument to any holder or indorser who pays the
instrument.
57. U.C.C. § 3-415(a) (1990 Revision). Subsection (1) of pre-revised section
3-414 contains essentially the same requirement.
58. See U.C.C. § 3-401(a) cmt. 1 (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-401(1) cmt. 1
(Pre-revision 1990).
59. See U.C.C. § 3-401(a) (1990 Revision). As explained in Official Com-
ment 1 to revised section 3-401, and further detailed in revised section 3-402,
the signature does not have to be made by the person sought to be charged, nor
is it necessary that the actual name of a person appear in the signature where
the signature is made by an agent or representative authorized to act on behalf
of the person. See U.C.C. §§ 3-401 cmt. 1, 3-402 (1990 Revision).
60. U.C.C. § 3-401 (Pre-revision 1990).
360 [Vol. 37
UNAUTHORIZED INDORSEMENTS
ates only to restrict the imposition of liability created under
other sections of the Code. Section 3-401 has generally been
interpreted to stand for the proposition that no drawer or in-
dorser contract ensues unless the instrument is signed by the
person sought to be charged with drawer or indorser liability
or has been signed by that person's authorized agent or repre-
sentative.6" In other words, it is the sections governing the
contract obligations of drawers 62 and indorsers 63 which oper-
ate to impose lability on a party to an instrument, not section
3-401. Section 3-401 makes it clear, however, that no con-
tract obligations arise with respect to a person who may have
dealt with the instrument-for example a transferor-but
who has not signed the instrument either personally or
through another person. The impact of section 3-401 becomes
particularly significant when a check bears a forged drawer's
signature or a forged payee's indorsement.
2. Effect of Forged Signatures on Contract Liability
When determining the effect of a forged signature on the
potential contract liability of a party, it is necessary to ex-
amine its effect on the forger as well as the person whose
name is forged. The rules under both versions of the Code
governing the effect of a forged signature are essentially the
same. 64 Pre-revised section 3-404(1) provides:
Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as
that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies
it or is precluded from denying it; but it operates as the
signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of any per-
61. Authority to sign another's name given after the signing operates retro-
actively to cause what was initially an unauthorized signature to be authorized
from the moment of its making. Subsection (2) of pre-revised section 3-404 pro-
vides: "[any unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes of this
Article." U.C.C. § 3-404(2) (1990 Pre-revision). Revised section 3-403(a), like-
wise, provides that: "la]n unauthorized signature may be ratified for all pur-
poses of this Article." U.C.C. § 3-403(a) (1990 Revision). See U.C.C. § 3-404
cmt. 3 (1990 Pre-revision); Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas, 454 F. Supp. 488, 491-92 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Murphey, supra
note 1.
62. U.C.C. § 3-414 (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-413 (Pre-revision 1990).
63. U.C.C. § 3-415 (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-414 (Pre-revision 1990).
64. Revised section 3-403(a) provides that: "Unless otherwise provided in
... Article (3] or Article 4, an unauthorized signature is ineffective except as the
signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of a person who in good faith pays
the instrument or takes it for value...." U.C.C. § 3-403 (1990 Revision). The
same rule is provided in U.C.C. section 3-404(1) (Pre-revision 1990).
1997]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
son who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for
value.
6 5
The effect on the actual forger of a forged signature66 to a
check is uncomplicated and clear. Regardless of the name
used, under both versions of the Code, a forged signature is
effective as the signature of the forger for any and all pur-
poses which the signature on the check may be relevant.6 v
For example, consider a situation where Sally Swift steals a
blank check from Dan Drawer and forges his signature. Be-
cause her forgery of Drawer's name is effective as her signa-
ture, Sally becomes obligated as a drawer 68 even though her
name does not appear on the check. Likewise, if Sally steals
a check issued by Dan to Janet Jones, then forges Janet's
name, the forgery, once again, is effective as Sally's signature
and Sally assumes the contract obligations of an indorser.69
In the above cases, unless the actions of Drawer or Jones
contributed to the forgeries or the actions have been ratified
by them, the effect of the forgeries on Drawer and Jones is
equally clear and uncomplicated. The forged signatures are
wholly ineffective as their signatures.7 ° Consequently, no
drawer contract obligations accrue to Dan, and Janet as-
sumes no indorser contract obligations since neither has
signed the checks as required for the imposition of liability.7 1
Where, however, negligent behavior by Drawer or Jones
substantially contributed to Swift's ability to make the for-
gery or unauthorized signature, the forgery may be treated
both as the signature of Drawer or Jones, and as the signa-
ture of Sally. The issue of negligence and whether a forgery
operates as an effective signature of the person whose name
is forged can arise in either of two situations. The first occurs
where the forgery is of the negligent person's name, for in-
65. U.C.C. § 3-404(1) (Pre-revision 1990).
66. "Forged signature" and "forgery" are not defined in the Code. However,
an "unauthorized signature" is defined in section 1-201(43) as "one made with-
out actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery." U.C.C. § 1-
201(43) (1990 Revision).
67. See supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
70. Both versions of Article 3 include a number of provisions which prohibit
a person from asserting that a forgery has occurred under certain extenuating
circumstances. See §§ 3-404, 3-405, 3-406 (1990 Revision); §§ 3-405, § 3-406
(Pre-revision 1990).
71. See U.C.C. § 3-401 (Pre-revision 1990 and 1990 Revision).
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stance where Dan Drawer's negligence results in Sally Swift's
forgery of his name as drawer, or where Janet Jones' negli-
gence results in the forgery of her signature as indorser. The
second situation arises where one person's negligence con-
tributes to the forgery of a different person's signature, as for
example, where Dan Drawer's negligence results in Sally's
forgery of Janet Jones' name as indorser.
Under the pre-revision of Article 3, where Dan's or Ja-
net's negligence significantly aided Sally in forging or placing
an unauthorized signature on an instrument, section 3-406
precludes Dan or Janet from asserting the forgery or unau-
thorized nature of the signature against a holder in due
course, drawee, other payor 72 or other person who, acting in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, paid the
instrument.73 Revised section 3-406 affords this protection to
an even larger class of claimants by precluding the negligent
person from asserting the forgery against any person who,
acting in good faith "pays the instrument or takes it for value
or collection." 74 Thus, under the revision, transferees who
fail to qualify as holders, and thus holders in due course, be-
cause of the forgery, may nonetheless avail themselves to the
preclusion of section 3-406. 75
With regard to the negligent person, under both versions
of section 3-406, where conditions are met so that the preclu-
sion applies, the unauthorized signature should logically, and
72. Pre-revised Article 3 fails to define the term "other payor" and its mean-
ing is difficult to ascertain from other provisions of the Article. The closest one
comes to gleaning a sense of the drafters' intended meaning is by looking at
similar terms in Article 4. According to pre-amended section 4-105(b), a payor
bank "means a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted." U.C.C
§ 4-105(b) (Pre-revision 1990). A "payor bank," according to Official Comment 2
"included a drawee bank and also a bank at which an item is payable if the item
constitutes an order on the bank to pay .... " U.C.C. § 4-105(b) cmt. 2 (Pre-
revision 1990).
73. Under pre-revised section 3-406, these situations are limited to 1) those
in which allowing the person whose negligence has substantially contributed to
an unauthorized signature to assert the lack of authority would operate to the
disadvantage of one who would be a holder in due course but for the unauthor-
ized signature and 2) a drawee or other person who, observing reasonable com-
mercial standards, paid the instrument.
74. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1990 Revision).
75. Because one must first qualify as a holder in order to qualify as a holder
in due course, the language of the pre-revision was confusing and difficult to
apply.
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by its terms,76 be treated as the valid signature of the person
whose name is signed for any and all purposes which that
person's signature might serve on the instrument.77 Thus,
where Dan Drawer's negligence caused Swift's forgery of his
name, he should incur the contractual obligations of a drawer
just as he would had he authorized Swift to sign his name.
Also, where his negligence resulted in Swift's forgery of
Jones' indorsement, Drawer should be estopped from assert-
ing the ineffectiveness of Jones' signature as a challenge to
the validity of an apparent negotiation and a transferee's sta-
tus as a holder.78
The preclusion under section 3-406 should apply in the
same manner and with equal force where a payee's negli-
gence causes the forgery of her name as indorser. For exam-
ple, where Janet Jones is the named payee on a check and
her negligence enables Swift to forge Jones' indorsement,
Jones should incur the contractual liability of an indorser.79
Additionally, Jones should be unable to assert the forgery of
her signature in challenging the validity of a transfer as a
valid negotiation. 0
Where the issue as to the effect of a forged signature on
the person whose name is forged arises following the
drawee's dishonor of the check, courts have exercised little
reluctance in invoking section 3-406 in the manner just dis-
cussed so that the loss falls on the negligent actual or ostensi-
ble drawer.8 ' Under both versions of the Code, an ostensible
drawer whose name is forged, substantially due to his own
76. The language of section 3-406 places no limitations on the applicability
of the preclusions based on the purpose the forged signature serves. See U.C.C
§ 3-406 (1990 Revision).
77. See supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. Dan's inability to assert
the forgery of Janet's signature is adopted in the revision. See U.C.C. §§ 3-
406(a), 3-417 (c) (1990 Revision). See also, infra notes 92-103 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the impact of these changes).
79. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Dubin v. Hudson County Probation Dep't, 630 A.2d 1207 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (permitting a check cashing enterprise to recover
against a defendant whose name was forged after thieves stole several checks
then, using defendant's signature stamp, forged defendant's name as drawer);
Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 207 N.E.2d 158 (111. App. Ct.
1965) (permitting recovery against a negligent drawer who mailed a check to
the wrong party with the same name as the intended payee).
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negligence, is liable under the drawer's contract provisions82
to any claimant who qualifies as a holder in due course.
83
Moreover, notwithstanding the forgery, no obstacles impact
the ability of transferees of a check bearing a forged drawer's
signature to qualify as holders in due course.8 4
Consider a scenario where Sally Swift steals one of Dan
Drawer's blank checks. She makes the check payable to her-
self, then forges Dan's signature as drawer using his signa-
ture stamp which, along with his checkbook, he negligently
left unattended. Sally, indorses the check with her own name
and deposits it in Depository Bank. Upon presentment to the
drawee, the check is dishonored. 5 As long as Depository
Bank had no knowledge or notice of the forgery and received
the check in good faith, it qualifies as a holder in due
course.8 6 However, because Dan Drawer's name is forged,
Depository Bank is not a holder in due course of a check
drawn by Dan Drawer, but of a check drawn by Sally Swift.
8 7
However, by invoking section 3-406, Dan is precluded from
asserting the forgery against Depository Bank because it
qualifies as a holder is due course of the check drawn by
Sally. The forgery is treated as though it was made by Dan
and he is, therefore, liable to Depository Bank under the con-
tract obligations of a drawer to the same extent he would be
had he actually signed the check himself.8 8
82. See U.C.C. § 3-414(b) (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-413(2) (Pre-revision
1990).
83. See U.C.C. § 3-406 (1990 Revision and Pre-revision 1990). Under the
revision, holders in due course are included in those persons who, in good faith,
take the instrument for value or collection.
84. As long as a transferee meets the criteria of pre-revised section 3-302(1)
or revised section 3-302(a), that person is a holder in due course, albeit not of
the instrument of the purported drawer, but of an instrument drawn by the
wrongdoer. See U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (Pre-revision 1990); U.C.C. § 3-302(a) (1990
Revision).
85. The check may have been dishonored for a number of reasons. For ex-
ample, Dan may have realized the theft and notified the drawee of the possible
forgery and the drawee dishonored it as a result. Other possibilities include
Dan's issuance of a stop payment order, insufficient funds in Dan's account to
cover the amount of the check or the account upon which the check was drawn
is no longer an active account.
86. See supra note 84.
87. See supra notes 66-69, 84 and accompanying text.
88. In this scenario, both Dan and Sally are subject to the potential contract
liability of a drawer. Sally may be held liable because under pre-revised section
3-404 and revised section 3-403, Dan's forged signature is effective as Sally's
signature. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, where a drawer's negligence results in the for-
gery of the payee's signature, and the check is thereafter dis-
honored, section 3-406 has successfully been invoked to per-
mit recovery against the drawer.89 Consider this situation in
a scenario where Dan actually signed as drawer on a check
which he made payable to Janet Jones. Instead of delivering
the check to Janet he negligently placed it in Sally Swift's
possession. After forging Janet's name as indorser, Sally in-
dorsed the check with her own name, then deposited the
check in Depository Bank. As an indorser, Depository Bank
is entitled to recover from Dan under Dan's contract obliga-
tions.9" This result, although doubtlessly correct, is not
clearly justified under either version of the Code.
Under both versions of the Code, the ability to enforce
the obligations on a check is conditioned on the ability of the
persons seeking enforcement to establish that they are hold-
ers or are vested with the rights of a prior holder.91 Deposi-
tory Bank, in the above example, cannot qualify as a holder
under the pre-revision without first invoking section 3-406 to
preclude Dan from asserting the forgery of Janet's indorse-
ment-an indorsement which is required before any person
can qualify as a holder.92 But, to invoke the preclusion under
pre-revised section 3-406, Depository Bank must qualify as
either a drawee, holder in due course, or other payor.
Clearly, Depository Bank does not qualify as a drawee93 and
its failure to qualify as a holder precludes it from qualifying
as a holder in due course.94 Depository Bank may qualify as
an "other payor," although the criteria for acquiring this sta-
89. Park State Bank v. Arena Auto. Auction, Inc., 207 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1965). Presumably, Arena Auto Auction's liability to Park State was based
on Arena Auto Auction's drawer's contract liability. Unfortunately, the basis
used by the court to justify liability is not entirely clear. Id.
90. See U.C.C. § 3-415(a) (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-414(1) (Pre-revision
1990).
91. See U.C.C. 88 3-301, 3-201(1) (Pre-revision 1990); U.C.C. §§ 3-203(b), 3-
301, 3-305 (1990 Revision).
92. See supra notes 43 and accompanying text.
93. Although not expressly defined in the pre-revision, a drawee as used
throughout the Code refers to the person to whom an order to pay a check or
other draft is directed. Revised U.C.C. section 3-103(a)(2) defines a drawee as
"a person ordered in a draft to make payment." U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(2) (1990
Revision).
94. U.C.C. § 3-302(a) (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (Pre-revision 1990).
But see Koerner & Lambert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 179 (La. Ct. App.
1979) and supra note 66.
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tus are not clearly set out in the Code.95 If the other payor
language in section 3-406 is construed to include a transferee
who paid the face amount of a check to its transferor, but who
was refused payment upon presentment, then Depository
Bank may utilize section 3-406 to preclude Dan Drawer from
asserting the forgery of Janet's signature. Estopped under
section 3-406 from asserting the forgery, Dan is unable to
contest the validity of the transfer to Depository Bank as a
valid negotiation or its status as a holder in due course.
Depository Bank's ability to recover from Dan Drawer
under the drawer contract provisions of the revised Code is
more easily achieved. Reaching this result via a well rea-
soned avenue requires meticulous study and application of
several Code provisions, however. Under the revision:
[T]he drawer is obliged to pay the [check] according to its
terms at the time it was issued, or if not issued, at the
time it first came into possession of a holder .... This
obligation is owed to a person entitled to enforce the draft
or to an indorser who paid the draft under section 3-415.96
To recover from Dan, Depository Bank must establish
that it is either a person entitled to enforce the check or that
it is an indorser who paid the check under revised section 3-
415. Any optimism that section 3-415 provides Depository
Bank with an easy way out is quickly squashed upon a review
of its criteria. After detailing the obligations of an indorser to
pay a dishonored instrument, revised section 3-415 provides:
"The obligation of the indorser is owed to a person entitled to
enforce the instrument or to a subsequent indorser who paid
the instrument under this section." 7 No additional guidance
is offered as to what criteria must be met before an indorser
may be deemed to have "paid" an instrument under the sec-
tion. In the absence of further explanation "paid" must be
construed in this context to refer to payment by an indorser
made in response to a demand for payment under the in-
dorser contract obligation provisions of revised section 3-415.
Construed in this manner, Depository Bank fails to qualify as
an indorser who paid the check under section 3-415.
Depository Bank may, nonetheless, recover from Dan
under his drawer's contract if it can show it is entitled to en-
95. See supra note 72.
96. U.C.C. § 3-414(b) (1990 Revision).
97. U.C.C. § 3-415(a) (1990 Revision) (emphasis added).
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force the check. The pertinent language in revised section 3-
301 provides: "'Person entitled to enforce' an instrument
means (i) the holder of the instrument, [or] (ii) a nonholder in
possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder
.... "98 Like its predecessor, to enforce a check under revised
Article 3, the aspiring enforcer must either qualify as a
holder or be vested with the rights of a prior holder.9 9 Fur-
ther, as was true under the pre-revision, an indorsement by
the named payee on a check is required under the revision
before a subsequent transferee can qualify as its holder.100
In our scenario, Sally has forged Janet's indorsement,
but Janet has not indorsed the check. Unlike the pre-revi-
sion, the revision clearly permits Depository Bank to utilize
section 3-406 to preclude Dan from asserting the forgery of
Janet's signature against it. The pertinent portion of section
3-406 provides: "[a] person whose failure to exercise ordinary
care substantially contributes to ... the making of a forged
signature on an instrument is precluded from asserting the
... forgery against a person who, in good faith, pays the in-
strument or takes it for value or collection."'' Depository
Bank both took the check for value 10 2 and for collection.10 3 As
a person entitled to enforce the instrument, Depository Bank
may recover from Dan on his drawer contract obligations.
C. Warranty Liability
Unlike contract liability, warranty obligations on a check
arise, not as a result of signing the instrument, but upon the
movement of an instrument. These movement warranties
are of two types: presentment warranties10 4 and transfer
98. U.C.C. § 3-301 (1990 Revision).
99. See U.C.C. § 3-203(b) (1990 Revision); and U.C.C. § 3-201(1) (Pre-revi-
sion 1990).
100. "'Holder' with respect to a negotiable instrument, means the person in
possession if the instrument is payable to bearer or, in the case of an instru-
ment payable to an identified person, [the identified person] if the identified
person is in possession." U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1990 Revision). See supra notes
43-44 and accompanying text.
101. U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1990 Revision) (emphasis added).
102. See U.C.C. §§ 3-303(a), 4-210(a) (1990 Revision).
103. See U.C.C. § 4-105(5) (1990 Revision).
104. The governing provisions appear in section 3-417(1) and section 4-
207(1) of the pre-revision and in section 3-418 and section 4-208 of the revision.
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warranties. 1 5 Presentment warranties arise any time pre-
sentment of an unaccepted check is made to the drawee for
payment or acceptance and is honored by the drawee. Pre-
sentment warranties are made not only by the presenter at
the time of presentment but by all previous transferors at the
time of their transfer of the check. 106 Transfer warranties, 1
0 7
on the other hand, attach any time a check is transferred' 08
for consideration. 10 9 Thus, regardless of whether a person
signs the check, if a person other than the issuer 1 ° passes a
check along to someone else and receives consideration, ac-
ceptance, or payment, the recipient of the check becomes the
beneficiary of a number of implied warranties.
Among the warranties made upon presentment is the
warranty that the presenter is a person, or is acting on behalf
of a person, entitled to enforce the instrument."' Implicit in
this warranty is the assurance that the instrument contains
no unauthorized or forged signatures which will give rise to a
conversion action or recoupment claim against the payor or
acceptor.11
2
105. The governing provisions are set out in pre-revised section 3-417(2) and
section 4-207(2) and revised section 3-416 and section 4-207.
106. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417(1), 4-207(1) (Pre-revision 1990); U.C.C. §§ 3-417, 4-
208 (1990 Revision).
107. Under the pre-revised version of Article 3, transfer warranties could be
disclaimed by transferring the instrument "without recourse." U.C.C. § 3-
417(3) (Pre-revision 1990). Under the revised version, these warranties may no
longer be disclaimed where checks are concerned. See U.C.C. § 3-416(c) (1990
Revision).
108. Revised section 3-203(a) provides that: "An instrument is transferred
when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to
the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument." U.C.C. § 3-
203(a) (1990 Revision).
109. Revised section 3-303(b) defines consideration as "any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract." U.C.C. § 3-303(b) (1990 Revision).
110. An issuer is the drawer of a check.
111. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417(a)(1), 4-208(a)(1) (1990 Revision). The pre-revision
contained a warranty that the presenter and prior transferors had good title to
the instrument or were authorized to obtain acceptance or payment on behalf of
someone who had good title. See U.C.C. § 3-417(1)(a) (Pre-revision 1990);
U.C.C. § 4-207(1)(a) (1990 revision). The warranty of good title posed serious
problems when dealing with bearer instruments since a person could become a
holder in due course by unwittingly taking a bearer instrument from a thief.
112. Revised section 3-301 provides that:
"Person entitled to enforce" an instrument means (i) the holder of the
instrument, (ii) a non-holder in possession of the instrument who has
the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instru-
ment who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 3-
309 [providing for enforcement of lost, destroyed or stolen instruments
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Transfer warranties are similar to presentment warran-
ties in that they include a warranty that the transferor is a
person entitled to enforce the instrument. 113 Transfer war-
ranties include the guarantee that the instrument contains
no unauthorized or forged signatures. 114 Further, unlike pre-
sentment warranties, transfer warranties encompass the as-
surance not only that all indorsements are authorized but
that the drawer's signature is also authorized. 15
Under both the presentment and transfer warranty pro-
visions, in addition to expenses and lost interest, a person to
whom the warranties run may recover from the warrantor an
amount equal to the loss suffered as a result of the breach of
warranty up to the face amount of the check.1
1 6
While both presentment and transfer warranties arise
upon movement, apart from the necessity of the warrantor's
signature on the instrument, presentment warranties arise
solely by the movement of the instrument independent of
whether the warrantor indorsed the check or received consid-
eration. 11 7 As previously noted, transfer warranties only
under certain circumstances] or 3-418(d) [providing for reinstatement
of rights in certain situations where payment or acceptance has been
made by mistake and is thereafter revoked].
U.C.C. § 3-301 (1990 Revision).
113. See U.C.C. §§ 3-416(a)(1), 4-207(a)(1) (1990 Revision).
114. Revised section 3-416 provides in pertinent part that:
(a) A person who transfers an instrument for consideration warrants to
the transferee and, if the transfer is by indorsement, to any subse-
quent transferee that:
(1) the warrantor is a person entitled to enforce the instrument;
(2) all signatures on the instrument are authentic and authorized;
(3) the instrument has not been altered;
(4) the instrument is not subject to a defense or claim in recoupment
of any party which can be asserted against the warrantor; and
(5) the warrantor has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding
commenced with respect to the maker or acceptor or, in the case
of an unaccepted draft, the drawer.
U.C.C. § 3-416 (1990 Revision). Revised section 4-207(a) uses slightly different
language to provide for identical warranties made by bank customers and col-
lecting banks who receive settlement or other consideration on an item. U.C.C.
§ 4-207(a) (1990 revision).
115. See U.C.C. §§ 3-416, 4-207(a) (1990 Revision).
116. See U.C.C. §§ 3-416(b), 3-417(b) (1990 Revision). The pre-revision con-
tained no comparable provisions concerning the appropriate measure of dam-
ages for breach of warranties.
117. Revised section 3-417 provides that:
(a) If an unaccepted draft is presented to the drawee for payment or
acceptance and the drawee pays or accepts the draft, (i) the person
obtaining payment or acceptance, at the time of presentment, and
UNAUTHORIZED INDORSEMENTS
arise if the transferor receives consideration when passing
the check along to someone else regardless of whether the
transferor indorses the check.11 However, the class of bene-
ficiaries to which transfer warranties extend is directly de-
pendent upon whether, in addition to receiving consideration,
the warrantor's transfer of the instrument is accompanied by
an indorsement. In the absence of an indorsement, transfer
warranties extend only to the transferor's immediate trans-
feree. However, if the transferor indorses the instrument,
the warranties extend to all future transferees.
119
The drafters' rationale for including an indorsement re-
quirement in the transfer warranty provisions in unclear.
The official comments offer no explanation for inclusion of the
indorsement requirement other than to say that "[i]f there is
an indorsement[,] the warranty runs with the instrument
and the remote holder may sue the indorser-warrantor di-
rectly and thus avoid a multiplicity of suits." 120 The per-
ceived need for an indorsement in order to avoid shifting of
the loss to the appropriate warrantor through multiple law-
suits where transfer warranties are concerned is particularly
perplexing given the absence of this requirement in the pre-
sentment warranty provisions. The presentment warranty
provisions allow the warranty of a previous transferor to ex-
(ii) a previous transferor of the draft, at the time of transfer, war-
rant to the drawee making payment or accepting the draft in good
faith that:
(1) the warrantor is, or was, at the time the warrantor transferred
the draft, a person entitled to enforce the draft or authorized to
obtain payment or acceptance of the draft on behalf of a person
entitled to enforce the draft;
(2) the draft has not been altered; and
(3) the warrantor has no knowledge that the signature of the drawer
of the draft is unauthorized.
U.C.C. § 3-417 (1990 Revision). Using slightly different language, the 1990
amended version of section 4-208 provides for identical warranties made by
bank customers and collecting banks. Substantially the same warranties are
contained in the pre-revision. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417(1), 4-207(1) (Pre-revision
1990).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
119. See supra note 114.
120. U.C.C. § 3-416 cmt. 1 (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-417 cmt. 7 (Pre-revi-
sion 1990). As explained by the drafters of the April 15, 1948 Proposed Final
Draft, under former Negotiable Instrument Law, the warranties of a transferor
who did not indorse the instrument ran only to the immediate transferee. See 6
ELIZABETH KELLY, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFrs 36 (1984).
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tend to the drawee who is farther removed from the prior
transferor-warrantor than any transferee.12 '
It is clear that under the provisions imposing contract li-
ability on an indorser, 122 before liability arises, a person's sig-
nature must appear on a check in the capacity of indorser.1
23
Under the transfer warranty provisions, it is equally clear
that a person who transfers a check and receives considera-
tion makes implied warranties to the immediate transferee
regardless of whether the transferor additionally indorses the
check. As an indorsement is unnecessary for the attachment
of warranties, the indorsement language in the transfer pro-
visions may create confusion as to whether liability based
solely on breach of warranty is at issue, or whether liability
arising out the indorser's contract obligations is also an ap-
propriate basis for granting a remedy.
D. Negligence and Liability in Forged Indorsement Cases
The proper role of an indorsement becomes even more
confusing when the indorsement is forged. Moreover, where
negligence has contributed to the forgery, a quagmire
emerges in which sound reasoning and application of section
3-406 and related provisions are often lost. A review of two
decisions addressing this issue highlights the confusion and
provides some insight into the often obscure rationale of
courts regarding the ability, or lack thereof, of a party to avail
itself to the preclusion of section 3-406 under contract princi-
ples versus warranty principles. In the first case, Park State
Bank v. Arena Auto Auction,' 24 the check was dishonored but
the ultimate loss was shifted to the negligent drawer under
contract liability principles. In the second, Girard Bank v.
Mount Holly State Bank, 25 the check was honored by the
drawee and the court held that section 3-406 could not form
the basis for an affirmative action by a depository bank to
shift the ultimate loss to the negligent drawer. 126
121. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
122. See U.C.C. § 3-414 (Pre-revision 1990); U.C.C. § 3-415 (1990 Revision).
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
124. 207 N.E. 2d 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
125. 474 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.J. 1979).
126. Id. Accord Commonwealth v. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 364 A.2d 1331
(Pa. 1976). But see Park State Bank, 207 N.E.2d 158 (permitting recovery via
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In Park State Bank, the drawer, Arena Auto Auction,
drew a check payable to Plunkett Auto Sales. The check was
erroneously delivered to Plunkett Auto Sales located in Illi-
nois rather than to Plunkett Auto Sales located in Alabama.
Although the Illinois dealer had never done business with
Arena Auto Auction, the dealership owner, Tom Plunkett,
fraudulently indorsed the check then cashed it at Plaintiffs
bank. 127 Prior to payment of the check by the drawee, the
mistake was discovered. Upon presentment of the check to
the drawee by Park State, it was dishonored in compliance
with Arena Auto Auction's stop payment order.128 Park State
sued Arena Auto Auction and, utilizing section 3-406 to pre-
clude Arena Auto Auction from asserting the forgery of
Plunkett's signature, was awarded judgment in the face
amount of the check. Presumably, the court based its holding
on Arena Auto Auction's drawer's contract obligation. 129
However, the court's opinion neither articulated the basis of
Arena Auto Auction's liability to Park State nor discussed
Park State's qualification as a holder in due course or other
payor so as to avail itself to the preclusion of section 3-406.
In Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 3 ° the
drawer (Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company) drew a check
payable to its insured and gave it to its agent for delivery to
the insured. Instead of forwarding the check directly to the
insured, the insured's indorsement was forged by the agent
and the check deposited into her personal account with De-
fendant, Mount Holly. The drawee (Girard), paid the check
upon presentment. The forgery was later discovered but only
after the forging agent had been permitted to withdraw the
funds. Girard brought a successful action against Mount
Holly. and was permitted to shift the loss to Mount Holly
direct action by presenting bank against negligent drawer who stopped pay-
ment on check).
127. Even though the names of both dealerships were identical, an indorse-
ment by Tom Plunkett is considered a forgery under Article 3 since Tom
Plunkett knew he was not the intended payee. See U.C.C. § 3-406 & cmt. 3
(1990 Revision).
128. See U.C.C. § 4-403 (1990 Revision) (the 1990 amendments did not mate-
rially affect this section).
129. See U.C.C. § 3-413 (Pre-revision 1990); and supra note 56 and accompa-
nying text.
130. 474 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.J. 1979).
1997]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
under the theory that Mount Holly had breached its present-
ment warranty of good title."3 '
In a third-party action, Mount Holly attempted to shift
the loss to Penn Mutual, the negligent drawer, on the theory
that under section 3-406, Penn Mutual was precluded from
asserting the agent's forgery of the payee's signature because
it was Penn Mutual's negligence in sending the check to the
agent rather than to the payee which made the forgery possi-
ble.132 The court refused to allow Mount Holly's claim, la-
menting that section 3-406 could not be used to shift the loss
to a negligent drawer by way of an affirmative action by a
depository bank even though the depository bank is liable to
a drawee under the warranty provisions of Articles 3 and
4.133 Thus, Mount Holly was stuck with the entire loss even
though Penn Mutual could have easily prevented the forgery
and subsequent loss had it exercised reasonable care and sent
the check directly to the payee.
In both cases the drawer was negligent in delivering the
checks to someone other than the true payees. In both cases
negligence substantially contributed to the forgery of the pay-
ees' indorsements. However, in Park State, the court permit-
ted the presenter to use section 3-406 to shift the loss to the
negligent drawer, while in Girard the court ruled that section
3-406 could not be used by the presenter to shift the loss to
the negligent drawer.13 4
The primary factual distinction between these two cases
is that, in Park State the presenter maintained possession of
the check because it was dishonored by the drawee, 35 while
in Girard the presenter lost possession of the check because it
was honored by the drawee.136 The legal consequences of this
distinction on the ability of the presenter to shift the loss to
131. The pre-amended version of section 4-207 provides that:
(1) Each customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or accept-
ance of an item and each prior customer and collecting bank war-
rants to the payor bank or other payor who pays the instrument
that
(a) he has good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or
acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title ....
U.C.C. § 4-207 (Pre-revision 1990).
132. Girard Bank, 474 F. Supp. at 1234-35.
133. Id. at 1235-36.
134. Id. at 1238-39.
135. See supra note 6.
136. See supra note 6.
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the person whose negligence substantially contributed to the
forgery of the payee's indorsement are both profound and un-
justified. The contradictory outcomes rest on an inequitable
difference in loss allocation under the rules governing con-
tract liability versus warranty liability.
As these two cases demonstrate, where the drawee dis-
honors a check bearing a forged payee's signature, the availa-
bility of depository banks and other transferors to utilize sec-
tion 3-406 to shift the loss to a negligent drawer is
remarkably different than where it is honored. Where the
check has been dishonored and recovery is sought based on
the contract obligation of a drawer or payee, section 3-406
may be used, not merely as a shield to avoid liability but as a
sword with which a plaintiff 37 may arm itself and affirma-
tively assert a claim against a negligent drawer. In cases
where the check was honored and recovery is being sought
from a negligent drawer or payee because a transferor or pre-
senter has been required to pay a subsequent transferee or
drawee under a warranty claim, the preclusion under section
3-406 is viewed as inapplicable.
Rules which permit loss allocation to turn on whether a
check is honored or dishonored are both inequitable and in-
consistent with the Code's overall loss allocation scheme. If a
check bearing a forged payee's indorsement is honored by the
drawee, the drawer can demand that the drawee recredit the
amount paid to the drawer's account. 138 Under the pre-re-
vised presentment warranty provisions, even though the
drawer's negligence was a substantial contributing factor in
causing the forgery, the drawee could elect not to invoke the
preclusion provision of section 3-406 against the drawer and
choose instead to recredit the drawer's account. 139 The
drawee could then recover the amount of the check from the
presenter, or from a prior transferor 141 of the check, under a
137. The term "plaintiff' as used here is intended to include any party to a
lawsuit who occupies the same position as a plaintiff would in a two party suit,
such as a defendant who files a counterclaim or an interpleader.
138. See U.C.C. § 4-401 (1990 Revision) (the 1990 amendments did not mate-
rially affect this section).
139. See U.C.C. § 3-417(1), 4-207(1) (Pre-revision 1990). See also Mellon
Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Merchants Bank, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 691 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
140. To perhaps state the obvious, a transferor is a person who transfers an
instrument. The term "transfer" is not defined in the pre-revision. However,
revised section 3-203(a) provides that: "An instrument is transferred when it is
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breach of warranty claim.14 1 Unlike revision, 142 the pre-revi-
sion contained neither a requirement nor an incentive for a
drawee to utilize section 3-406 as a defense to recrediting a
negligent drawer's account. This was particularly true where
the check had passed through either a depository or collecting
bank prior to reaching the drawee bank.
A warrantor (warrantor E) compelled to pay a drawee
under a breach of presentment warranty claim could, assum-
ing it received consideration, shift the loss to its transferor
(warrantor D) under the transfer warranty provisions. If
each transferee received consideration when the instrument
was taken, the loss could be shifted back down the chain in
this manner to prior transferors under a breach of warranty
theory to the point that the loss rests with the person (war-
rantor B) who took the check from the forger. 143 However,
because the named payee never actually transferred the
check, but only enabled the thief to transfer it, the payee has
not made any warranties. Warrantor B, therefore, is unable
to further shift the loss to the negligent payee even though
the payee was in a superior position to B to have prevented
the forgery and subsequent loss.
The warranty scheme of loss shifting facilitates the gen-
eral policy and goal of placing the ultimate loss attendant to
forgeries on the person in the best position to have prevented
the loss in the absence of negligence. It falls short of achiev-
ing success, however, where the forged indorsement is occa-
sioned by the drawer's or payee's negligence. Moreover, the
ultimate loss is allocated differently under the warranty prin-
ciples where the check is honored than it would have been
had the check been dishonored. Had the check in the above
situation been dishonored by the drawee when presented and
delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the per-
son receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument." U.C.C. § 3-203(a)
(1990 Revision). In the majority of cases the presenter or transferor upon
whom the loss ultimately falls is another bank.
141. See U.C.C. § 3-417(1) (Pre-revision 1990).
142. Section 3-417(c) of the revision removes the drawee's discretion in situa-
tions where the drawer's negligence substantially contributes to the forgery of
the payee's signature by permitting a warrantor to invoke the preclusion in sec-
tion 3-406 as a defense against the drawee.
143. Under warranty principles, unless they expressly disclaim liability,
prior transferors may be held liable even though they had no knowledge or no-




B compelled to pay the check under its indorser's contract ob-
ligation,144 B would have the ability to further shift the loss
to the negligent payee under the payee's indorser's contract
obligation. 145 Had the check been dishonored, B would be en-
titled to demand surrender of the check upon payment.
14 6
Thereafter, B could demand payment from the payee under
the payee's indorser's contract obligations. Even though the
payee's signature was forged, the payee would be estopped
under section 3-406 from asserting the forgery and the for-
gery would be treated as a valid indorsement by the payee.
The inconsistencies in loss allocation that were depen-
dent upon whether a check was honored or dishonored were
particularly harsh under the pre-revision when the forgeries
resulted from the negligent acts of an ostensible party to the
instrument. Section 3-417(1) of the pre-revision provides
that: "Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and
any prior transferor warrants to a person who in good faith
pays or accepts that (a) he has good title to the instrument or
is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of
one who has good title .... ,, Under this provision, negli-
gence contributing to a forged signature is irrelevant in war-
ranty actions because liability is premised on the physical
transfer or movement of the instrument and not on the valid-
ity or genuineness of the signature incident to that transfer.
Because the drawee could avoid the ultimate loss by re-
covering from the depository or collecting bank in a warranty
action, from a practical business standpoint, it was generally
viewed as far wiser for the drawee to pursue a warranty
claim against a competing bank than to antagonize its cus-
tomer-drawer.' 48 Further, the collecting or depository bank
could not utilize the preclusion rule under section 3-406 be-
144. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
146. Both versions of Article 3 require a person making presentment to sur-
render the instrument to a person paying the instrument in full if so requested.
See U.C.C. § 3-501(b)(2) (1990 Revision); U.C.C. § 3-505(1)(d) (Pre-revision
1990).
147. U.C.C. § 3-417(1) (Pre-revision 1990).
148. See, e.g., Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225
(D.N.J. 1979). See also Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Merchants Bank., 15
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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cause they were considered neither holders in due course,' 49
drawees, nor other payors. 150
IV. IMPORTANT CHANGES UNDER THE 1990 REVISION AND
AMENDMENTS
The drafters of the 1990 revision of Article 3 and amend-
ments to Article 4 attempted to remedy much of the confusion
and inconsistencies inherent in the pre-revised provisions
concerning loss allocation involving negligence of a party to
the instrument. Two major problems are solved under the re-
visions. Revised section 3-406(a) now provides: "[a] person
whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially contrib-
utes to . .. the making of a forged signature on an instru-
ment is precluded from asserting the . . . forgery against a
person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for
value or collection."' 5' By extending the ability to utilize the
preclusion to a person who acquires a check in good faith and
gives value for it or processes it for collection, depository and
collecting banks are now afforded the same protection under
section 3-406 previously reserved for holders in due course,
drawees and other payors. It is unlikely that this change will
be construed as providing the basis for an affirmative action
by a depository or collecting bank against a negligent drawer
or payee. The change will, however, aid a transferor who
does not have the rights of a holder in recovering, under
drawer and indorser contract liability, from a person whose
negligence caused a forgery on the instrument.
149. Prior to the 1990 amendments, "holder" was defined in section 1-201(20)
of the Code as "a person who is in possession of... an instrument ... drawn,
issued, or indorsed to him or his order or to bearer or in blank." U.C.C. § 1-
201(20) (Pre-revision 1990). Further, under section 3-302, in order to qualify as
a holder in due course, one must first qualify as a holder. Consequently, where
a signature necessary to the chain of title is forged, transferees subsequent to
the forged signature do not become holders and, ergo, cannot qualify as holders
in due course.
See Douglas J. Whaley, Forged Indorsements and the UCC's "Holder", 6
IND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1972) (Professor Whaley encourages the notion of a more
liberal interpretation of "holder" in other sections of the Code where the context
of its use severely limits or renders the sections virtually useless, as for exam-
ple in section 3-417(2) involving warranties; sections 3-206(3) and (4) involving
the effect of restrictive indorsements and section 3-306(d) governing the rights
of one who is not a holder in due course).
150. See, e.g., Mellon Nat'l Bank, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 696; Girard Bank,
474 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
151. U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1990 Revision).
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The problem of permitting a drawee bank to recredit the
account of a drawer whose negligence substantially assisted
in the forgery of a payee's indorsement, and then to shift the
loss to a depository or collecting bank under a warranty
claim, is also remedied under the revisions. Under revised
section 3-417(c), a warrantor may avoid liability to a drawee
by establishing, without limitations, the effectiveness of the
indorsement through the use of sections 3-404 and 3-405.
However, the ability to escape liability in a warranty action
by invoking sections 3-404 and 3-405 is limited to situations
involving fictitious payees, impostors and employers who
have entrusted responsibility of the check to a dishonest
employee.
Section 3-417(c) further permits a warrantor to avoid lia-
bility in a warranty action by a drawee by showing that a
drawer is precluded from asserting that an indorsement is
unauthorized under section 3-406.152 However, under section
3-417(c), the ability to raise the preclusion under section 3-
406 as a defense in a warranty action is limited to those in-
stances in which an indorsement has been forged due to the
negligence of the drawer. Revised section 3-417(c) does not
extend its coverage to permit a warrantor to defend itself
against a drawee in a warranty action by establishing that
the payee's negligence substantially contributed to the for-
gery of his or her indorsement on the instrument. Thus, in a
situation where a payee's negligence leads to the making of
an unauthorized indorsement, unless the forger obtains the
check by impersonating the payee, is a fictitious payee, 153 or
is an employee of the payee entrusted with responsibility for
the instrument,1 5 4 the warrantor cannot escape liability Lo a
drawee who brings a warranty action even though the wai-
152. In pertinent part, revised section 3-417(c) provides: "If a drawee asserts
a claim for breach of warranty under (a) based on an unauthorized indorsement
•.. the warrantor may defend by proving that the... drawer is precluded under
Section 3-406 ... from asserting against the drawee the unauthorized indorse-
ment.... ." U.C.C. § 3-417(c) (1990 Revision).
153. See U.C.C. § 3-404 (1990 revision). This section governs two discrete
types of situations. The first is one in which an imposter dupes a drawer into
issuing a check to the imposter, payable to the person whose identity is being
usurped. The second is where the drawer, or the drawer's cohort, issues a check
payable to a fictitious payee.
154. See U.C.C. § 3-405 (1990 Revision). This section governs situations
where an employer has entrusted an employee with certain responsibilities in-
volving an instrument and the employee fraudulently indorsed the instrument.
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rantor can prove the forgery of the payee's signature was sub-
stantially, or even totally, caused by the payee's own negli-
gence. The problem which remains unsolved under the
revision can best be illustrated by the following hypothetical
scenario and discussion.
HYPOTHETICAL: Depository Bank [Depository] accepts for de-
posit a paycheck issued by Diane Drawer, payable to the or-
der of Paul Payee. Depository forwards the check to Drawee
Bank [Drawee] who pays it. Depository subsequently per-
mits withdrawal of the proceeds of the check. It turns out the
check was stolen by Sam Plumber who forged Payee's in-
dorsement to the check. Upon demand by Drawer, Drawee
recredits Drawer's account and brings a warranty action
against Depository based on Payee's forged indorsement. De-
pository Bank has credible and conclusive evidence to prove
the forgery occurred because Payee negligently left his
paycheck, along with his checkbook containing carbon repro-
ductions of his signature, lying in open view on the kitchen
counter while Sam Plumber was permitted unaccompanied
access to Payee's home to repair the kitchen sink.
Depository Bank will not be able to use this proof in
mounting a defense against Drawee. By its terms, section 3-
417(c), extends the preclusion protection of section 3-406 to
those situations in which the drawer is precluded from as-
serting an unauthorized indorsement. Because Payee's negli-
gence rather than Drawer's negligence was responsible for
the forgery of Payee's signature, section 3-406 would preclude
Payee from asserting that the indorsement was unauthorized.
However, as section 3-406 serves only as a shield to estop the
negligent person from asserting the forgery of his or her own
signature, section 3-406 would not preclude Drawer from as-
serting that Payee's indorsement was unauthorized.
A payor or drawee 155 may only charge against the cus-
tomer's or drawer's 156 account those items which are properly
payable.'1 7 In the above scenario, under Article 4 of the
Code, Drawer could require that Drawee recredit her ac-
count. Section 4-401(a) states that: "A bank may charge
against the account of a customer an item that is properly
155. Under Article 3, a bank in this situation is called a drawee.
156. Under Article 3, a customer in this situation is referred to as a drawer.
157. See U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1990 Revision).
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payable from the account .... An item is properly payable
from the account if it is authorized by the customer and is in
accordance with any agreement between the customer and
the bank."15 ' A check which is cashed over a forged payee's
signature is regarded as being unauthorized by the customer
and therefore not properly payable.
159
Where a drawee pays a check which is not properly paya-
ble and debits the drawer's account, the drawer may demand
the amount be credited back to the account.160 Where the
drawer makes this demand, unless the drawee can avail itself
to the subrogation provisions of section 4-407,161 the drawee
is obligated to credit the drawer's account in the amount of
the check.'62 Subrogation rights under section 4-407, how-
ever, may only be exercised where recrediting the drawer's
account will result in unjust enrichment. 163 Even then, sub-
rogation is not available to a drawee to permit refusal to
recredit drawer's account unless the only means of prevent-
ing a loss to the drawee is by refusing to recredit the ac-
count.16 4 In situations where the drawee can avoid the loss
by shifting it to a depository or collecting bank via a warranty
158. U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1990 Revision).
159. See id. at cmt. 1. See, e.g., Valley Bank v. Monach Inv. Co., 800 P.2d
634, 638 (Idaho 1990); Ambassador Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Indiana Natl Bank, 605
N.E.2d 746, 751 (Ind. 1992); Perini Corp. v. First Natl Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 403
(5th Cir. 1977). See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 15-3 (4th ed. 1995).
160. See U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1990 Revision).
161. Section 4-407 provides that:
If a bank has paid an item over the order of the drawer or maker to
stop payment, or after an account has been closed, or otherwise under
circumstances giving a basis for objection by the drawer or maker, to
prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary to prevent
loss to the bank by reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank is
subrogated to the rights
(1) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or
maker;
(2) of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer
or maker either on the item or under the transaction out of
which the item arose; and;
(3) of the drawer or maker against the payee or any other holder of
the item with respect to the transaction out of which the item
arose.
U.C.C. § 4-407 (1990 Revision).
162. See Peck v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1967).
163. See U.C.C. § 4-407 (1990 Revision).
164. See id.
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action, the drawee will not suffer a loss by recrediting
drawer's account.
As previously indicated, section 3-417(c) does not permit
the use of the preclusion under section 3-406 in a warranty
action by a drawee unless the drawer's negligence has made
the forgery possible. In the above hypothetical, since it was
Paul Payee's negligence and not Diane Drawer's negligence
which caused the forgery of Payee's indorsement, Depository
Bank will be unable to avoid liability to Drawee in a war-
ranty action. 165 The drafters' purpose for this gap in the loss
allocation scheme is unclear. One plausible reason for ex-
cluding a negligent payee from the newly created warrantor
defenses under section 3-417(c) might be the concern of plac-
ing the drawee bank in the precarious position of recrediting
the drawer's account and being unable to recover in a war-
ranty action because the depository bank proves the payee
was negligent when the drawee attempts to pass the loss
back down the chain. However, research efforts failed to sub-
stantiate this as a possible concern.
At first blush, a loophole which allows this result may
seem equitable. After all, one might surmise that since the
drawer was not negligent, the drawer should not bear the
loss. However, permitting the warrantor to utilize section 3-
406 to avoid liability in a situation such as this, does not re-
sult in a loss to the drawer. If the warrantor were permitted
the use of section 3-406's preclusion, the loss would fall
squarely on Payee - the negligent person, and the person in
the best position to have prevented the loss. By issuing the
check to Payee, Drawer lost all rights to the check. 166 Re-
vised section 3-420 expressly provides that: "An action for
conversion of an instrument may not be brought by (i) the
issuer ... of the instrument."1 67 Further, Drawer fully ex-
pected the bank to pay the check and debit the amount of the
check from her account. This is precisely what Drawee has
done. Thus, Drawer has lost nothing. Further, while Drawer
probably anticipated Payee would benefit from the proceeds
of the check, as an instrument payable to Payee's order,
Drawer had no ability to ensure or require that Payee use the
check for a beneficial or intended purpose. Additionally, if
165. See U.C.C. § 3-417(c) (1990 Revision).
166. See U.C.C. § 3-420(a) (1990 Revision).
167. U.C.C. § 3-420 (1990 Revision).
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Payee had indorsed the check in blank rather than negli-
gently leaving the means to enable that indorsement to be
readily forged by Plumber and Plumber had then stolen and
cashed the check, the loss would clearly fall on Payee with no
recourse other than to recover from Plumber. Drawer would
not be entitled to demand that Drawee recredit her account,
therefore no warranty action would arise and Depository
would not be liable to Payee in conversion.
168
If a negligent payee brings a conversion action against
either the drawee bank or depository bank, the bank may de-
fend by invoking the estoppel provision under section 3-406.
If Payee in the above scenario brings a conversion action
against Depository, by utilizing section 3-406 to preclude
Payee from asserting that his indorsement was unauthorized
and establishing it was Payee's own negligence that substan-
tially contributed to the making of the unauthorized indorse-
ment, Depository could escape liability to Payee. Unable
under section 3-406 to assert Plumber's forgery of his in-
dorsement because of his own negligence, Payee would be
barred from recovery. The loss would then properly be borne
by Payee who is the person who could have best prevented
the loss occasioned by the forgery.
The problem in the above hypothetical is further com-
pounded under the current provisions of Article 3 by a judi-
cial consensus which interprets section 3-406 as not including
an affirmative right of action which would allow a depository
bank to bring a direct action against the negligent payee.
169
Supported by the official comments to section 3-406, a war-
rantor, such as Depository Bank, who is required to reim-
burse a drawee under the warranty provisions cannot utilize
section 3-406 as a basis for bringing an affirmative action
168. A check which is endorsed in blank becomes a bearer instrument mak-
ing whomever is in possession of the check a holder. See U.C.C. § 1-201(20)
(1990 Revision). Under section 3-301 of revised Article 3, a holder is entitled to
enforce the instrument. Section 3-301 was revised to clear up misunderstand-
ing under the pre-revision regarding the ability of a person in possession of a
stolen bearer instrument to qualify as a holder. See U.C.C. § 3-301, & cmt.
(1990 Revision).
169. See Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Merchants Bank, 15 U.C.C. Rep.
691 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp.
1225 (D.N.J. 1979).
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against Paul Payee. 170 Furthermore, it appears that most ju-
risdictions do not recognize a common law negligence right of
action in these situations.
1 71
Another solution to the problem posed by the above sce-
nario is to deny a drawer the ability to require that a drawee
recredit her account for checks properly issued by her, but
paid over a forged payee's indorsement. Under the current
interpretation of the applicable rules, Drawer, in the above
hypothetical, can choose to assist the negligent payee in cir-
cumventing the basic loss allocation scheme of placing the
loss on the person who could have best prevented it, by sim-
ply requiring Drawee to recredit her account. She can then
issue the negligent Payee another check and neither she nor
Payee suffers a loss. In this scenario, Depository, if unable to
recover from thief, must bear the entire loss.
If Payee were to bring a conversion or recoupment claim
against Depository, by utilizing revised section 3-406 Deposi-
tory could prevent Payee from recovering for any portion of
the loss due to the forgery, which was substantially caused by
his negligence. 172 This result is not only equitable but is con-
sistent with the provisions of the Code which prohibit Drawer
from bringing a conversion action in this situation. 173 To dis-
allow Drawer the ability to recover from Depository in a di-
rect action but to allow recovery through a loophole is unten-
able. After all, since it is the negligent payee who lost
possession of the check, it is far more appropriate to require
the payee to take appropriate steps to recover payment than
to shift the loss to a depository or collecting bank who is left
with no recourse against the negligent payee. Further, hav-
ing issued and delivered the instrument to the payee, the
drawer has no claim to the instrument and has not suffered
any loss as a result of payment by the drawee.
170. Official Comment 1 to revised section 3-406 states that the section "does
not make the negligent party liable in tort for damages resulting from the [for-
gery]." U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 1 (1990 revision).
171. Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, decided by a federal district
court construing New Jersey law appears to be the only published decision
which interprets the Code as not having displaced a common law action
grounded in negligence. 474 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.J. 1979).
172. Revised section 3-406(b) provides for recovery based on comparative
negligence principles. U.C.C. § 3-406(b) (1990 Revision).
173. See U.C.C. § 3-420 (1990 Revision).
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Finally, denying Drawer the right to have her account
recredited is not unsupported by the Code. While section 4-
401 limits a bank's ability to debit its customer's account to
those items that are properly payable, 174 there is a valid basis
for the proposition that payment in the above situation falls
within section 4-401's properly payable limitations.
Consider the following: Diane Drawer directed Drawee
to pay the check in accordance with Paul Payee's instruc-
tions. 175 The method through which Payee provides Drawee
with the instruction as to who should receive payment is by
indorsing the check.' 7 6 A blank indorsement by Payee in-
structs Drawee to pay the check to its bearer. 177 Payment by
Drawee to any person who possesses the check, if done pursu-
ant to an effective indorsement by Payee, is a payment which
is properly payable. The issue then becomes whether the for-
gery of Payee's signature is effective as his indorsement.
Under revised section 3-406, Payee, because his negli-
gence substantially contributed to the forgery of his signa-
ture, is precluded from asserting the forgery against Deposi-
tory who took the check for value and collection.'17 Through
operation of revised section 3-406, the signature purporting
to be Payee's is effective as his indorsement as far as it affects
Depository. As Payee's effective signature, it is effective as
an indorsement which causes Sam Plumber's transfer to De-
pository to result in a valid negotiation 179 and further causes
Depository to become not only a mere holder, but a holder in
due course.18 0 While the notion that a check bearing a forged
indorsement is not properly payable appears to enjoy wide, if
not universal support,' 8 ' nothing in the actual provisions of
the Code mandates such a conclusion. Indeed, application of
the provisions in the above manner is not only entirely con-
sistent with the actual language of the provisions, but is the
174. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
176. See supra text accompanying note 46.
177. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
178. See U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1990 Revision).
179. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
180. Revised section 3-302 indicates that a holder in due course is a holder to
whom the instrument was negotiated or issued who took in good faith, for
value, without notice of any unauthorized signatures on it, and without notice
of any claims to it or defenses to its enforcement. U.C.C. § 3-302 (1990
Revision).
181. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
3851997]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
better reasoned application of all the provisions when taken
as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
Under current application of the Code, if requested, a
drawee must recredit the drawer's account for payment of a
check bearing a forged payee's indorsement, even though the
payee's negligence substantially contributed to the forgery.
The drawee is then permitted to shift the loss to the deposi-
tory bank under warranty rules. Unable to shift the loss to
the negligent payee under Code provisions, the depository
bank must bear the entire loss while the negligent payee
completely escapes liability. This loophole in the loss alloca-
tion scheme severely thwarts the goal of placing the loss on
the person who is in the best position to prevent the loss re-
sulting from the forgery. Unless inadvertently created, the
drafters' rationale for incorporating this loophole is unclear.
By prohibiting the drawer from demanding recredit from
the drawee and requiring the payee to pursue a conversion or
recoupment claim this loophole will be eliminated. A payee
who is free from negligence will be able to recover and the
warranty provisions will operate to properly place the ulti-
mate loss on the person who took the instrument from the
wrongdoer. Where negligence of a payee substantially con-
tributed to the forgery and subsequent loss, the appropriate
portion of the loss will be properly placed on the payee by de-
nying recovery to the extent the payee's negligence contrib-
uted to the loss. This result can be achieved by interpreting
the rules under Revised Articles 3 and 4 as construing "prop-
erly payable" to include payment in accordance with any in-
struction by the payee deemed effective under the provisions
of the revised Code.
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